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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
P. JAMES COLEMAN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
R. EARL DILLMAN, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16666 
16926 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
P. James Coleman is appealling from two adverse judgments 
rendered by the Third District Court in separate actions. In 
case number 16666, after trial to the bench, Judge David K. 
Winder entered a judgment denying Coleman specific performance 
of an alleged oral contract for the sale of land. In case 
number 16926, after submission of the matter on stipulated 
facts, Judge Jay E. Banks entered judgment granting R. Earl 
Dillman damages and possession of certain real property on 
his Complaint against Coleman for unlawful detainer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have both judgments entered below 
affirmed by this Court. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual contentions of the parties in case number 16; 
are entirely at odds and appellant's statement of the facts, 
while accurately representing his contentions at trial, fail 
to acknowledge the evidence upon which the judgment in that 
action was based and require supplementation as follows: 
P. James Coleman moved into a home owned by R. Earl Oil~ 
in late January of 1975. While Coleman testified that he mo~ 
in after reaching an oral agreement to purchase t~e property 
for $36,000.00, to be paid in monthly installments of $303.29 
at 3 1/2 or 9 percent interest, Dillman testified that he mer' 
agreed to rent Coleman the property while he was attempting 
to sell it if Coleman would make payments of $303.29 per 
month. (R. llO) The rental payment was the same as the 
previous tenant had been paying and was equal to the amount 
Dillman paid monthly on a Deed of Trust to First Security 
Bank covering the property. (R. 108) 
At the time Coleman moved in the home was listed for sal: 
through a realtor for $45,000.00 and was being advertised for 
sale during the first three months of Coleman's occuoancy. 
(R. 157) Coleman and his co-tenant, however, kept removing t: 
"for sale" signs from the property. (R. 105, 158) 
Coleman was deliquent in making his monthly payment from 
the inception of his occupancy and his payments, when offered, 
were frequently made with checks drawn on insufficient funds. 
(R. 111, exhibit P-2) Whe he did make payments he was issued 
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receipts with the notation of "rent" in them (exhibits P-3,4,5) 
which he acknowledged he altered prior to trial to eliminate the 
reference to rent. (R. 42) 
While there was dispute regarding what was paid, both parties 
acknowledged that in November of 1976 a note was signed by 
Coleman in favor of Dillman which acknowledged that as of 11/7/76 
$3,633.00 "rent" was due (R. 116-17, 173), though Coleman at 
some time before trial corssed out the word "rent" on the 
document. (R. 174) After December of 1976, Coleman ceased 
making any monthly payments. (R. 20, 30-32, 62-63) Dillman 
repeatedly requested rent payments (R. 112, 113, 121, 158, 
exhibit D-20), but Coleman put him off with representations 
that he would be inhereting a large sum of cash in the near 
future from which accounts could be settled. (R. 113) 
Finally, on June 5, 1978, Mr. Dillman had Mr. Coleman 
served with a formal notice to pay rent due or quit the premises. 
(R. 27) Coleman responded by filing an action for specific 
performance two days later (R. 2-3), which is the basis of case 
number 16666, and Mr. Dillman filed a Complaint for unlawful 
detainer (R. 4) before being served with Coleman's Complaint. 
The two actions were consolidated for trial purposes but were 
severed again when the Court ruled that one (16666) was not 
triable to a jury and the other (16926) was. Case 16666 pro-
ceeded to trial on August 8, 1979, with a judgment being 
rendered against Coleman. On January 24, 1980 case 16926 
came up for jury trial but the parties stipulated to the facts, 
based largely on the court's earlier decision that no enforceable 
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contract existed between the parties, and a judgment awardin: 
damages and possession of the property was rendered for Mr. 
Dillman. (R. 42) 
As the appellant only raises issues concerned with thet 
of case 16666, this brief will be confined to discussion of 
that action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A JURY TRIAL IN HIS ACTION FOR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
It is settled law in this jurisdiction that an action ~ 
specific performance of an alleged oral contract for the sale 
of any interest in real property, based upon a claim of part 
performance of the contract, is purely equitable in nature ar. 
that no cause of action at law is even stated by a Complaint 
which seeks money damages for the alleged breach of such an 
oral contract. In Baugh v. Darlev, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 
(1947), this Court stated unequivocally that the doctrine whe: 
by part performance of an oral agreement for the sale of lane 
might operate to avoid the affect of the statute of frauds 
was solely a creation of equity and had no application in 
an action at law. 
The basis of the doctrine originally was that 
equity would not permit the statute to be used 
as an instrument for the perpetration of a 
fraud. The doctrine is now firmly established 
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in the rules of equity jurisprudence of both 
England and most of our states. It is almost 
equally well established that the doctrine 
is purely equitable in nature, and has no 
place in an action at law. 
184 P.2d at 337. 
It is equally well established that a party to an action 
which is primarily equitable in nature has no right to trial 
of that case before a jury, and that the trial court is vested 
with broad discretion in making the determination of whether 
or not an action is equitable or legal. In Sweeney v. Hapoy 
Vallev, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966), this Court 
upheld the trial court's denial of a jury trial in a case in-
valving mixed issues of law and equity by noting that 
In circumstances where doubt exists as 
to whether the cause should be regarded as 
one in equity, or one in law wherein the 
party can insist on a jury as a matter of right, 
the trial court should have some latitude of 
discretion. In making that determination it 
is not bound by the ostensible form of the 
action, nor by the particular wording of. the 
pleadings. It may examine into the nature 
of the rights asserted and the remedies sought 
in the light of the facts of the case to as-
certain which predominates; and from that 
determination make the appropriate order as 
to a jury of non-jury trial. The fact that 
the division of court hearing the pre-trial 
indicates that the case is set for a trial by 
jury is entitled to some consideration and should 
not be countermanded without good reason. 
Nevertheless it is the prerogative of the judge 
who actually tries the case to make the deter-
mination. Unless it is shown that the ruling 
was patently in error or an abuse of discretion, 
this court will not interfere with the ruling 
thereon. 
18 Utah 2d at 117. See also, Norback v. Board of Directors of 
-5-
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Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P.2d 339 (1934). 
In the instant case, where the complaint seeks specific per-
formance, there is no question that the primary thrust of the 
action is equitable and that no right to jury trial attaches. 
This Court has previously held that there is no right to jur1· 
trial in an action for specific performance on a real estate 
contract. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974). 
This decision is in accord with those rendered in all juris-
dictions which have considered the question. See, e.g. , Set: 
v. Dellacroce, 169 Colo. 212, 454 P.2d 804 (1969); Moun-
tain View Corp. v. Horne, 74 N.M. 541, 395 P.2d 676 (1964); 
Phillies v. Johnson, 266 Or. 544, 514 P.2d 1337 (1973); 
Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163, rehearing deniec 
69 Wyo. 439, 244 P.2d 805 (1952). 
The only authority cited by the appellant for the conte 
that the denial of a jury trial was error is Willard ~- MilM 
Investment Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah 1978), which case: 
wholly inapposite here. That case was tried to a jury 
without objection by either party even though, as an equity 
case, the jury was not a matter of right. This Court merely 
noted that, under Rule 39(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a case in which trial by jury doesn't exist as a 
matter of right but which is tried to a jury by mutual cons~ 
. I 
should be governed by the same rules applicable to jury tna. 
generally. In this action the respondent filed a specific 
objection to the jury setting (R. 44) and the Cox decision ha 
no bearing to the issues presented herein. 
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The clear law of this jurisdiction, and that of all others 
employing similar rules of procedure, is that no right of trial 
by jury exists in an action for specific performance and the 
court below did not err in so ruling. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANT 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A DECREE OF 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
In the Findings in case number 16666, the District Court 
noted that it was not necessary to even reach the question of 
whether or not there was an oral contract for the purchase and 
sale of the subject property because the evidence presented by 
the appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient performance on 
his part to raise any equities in his favor even if there was 
a contract as he alleged. This finding is wholly supported by 
the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Coleman had no written agreement 
signed by Mr. Dillman sufficient to satisfy the relevant re-
quirements of Utah's Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. §35-5-3 
(1953), which provides that: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of 
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall 
be void unless the contract, or same note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the lease or sale is 
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereun-
to authorized in writing. (emphasis added) 
Coleman asserted, however, that his part performance of 
the alleged contract was sufficient to allow for an equitable 
-7-
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decree of specific performance. To evaluate this claim in 
light of the evidence presented at trial it is important to 
bear in mind the purpose of this equitable exception to the 
operation of the statute of frauds and the quality and 
quantity of proof required of the party urging it. 
It has long been recognized that the part performance 
doctrine was created by equity to prevent a seller from usi~ 
the statute of frauds to invalidate agreements under which ~ 
purchaser had taken substantial steps to carry out his porti: 
of the contract and materially changed his position in rel~ 
upon ~~e clearly established terms of such agreement. The 
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the statute from bei~ 
used as a tool to defraud an unwary purchaser. However, it 
has also been historically acknowledged that this equitable 
doctrine will no provide the basis for relief in cases when 
the purchaser's efforts and expenditures on the subject p~~ 
do not at least equal the value he has recieved from posses~ 
and use of such property and operation of the statute does 
not work any hardship upon him. 
In Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262 (19221 
this Court considered a case wherein the alleged contract 
purchaser had held possession of the property for four years 
during which time he had made monthly payments and some rnino: 
improvements on the land. The Court, in reversing a decree 
of specific performance, noted that the total of the buyer's 
-8-
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alleged payments and improvements did not equal the undisputed 
rental value of the property during his period of possession 
and held, therefore, that there was an insufficient equitable 
basis to support an order of specific performance. 
In view of this feature of the case, it cannot 
be successfully contended that plaintiff's re-
liance on the statute of frauds as a bar in 
the instant case operates as a fraud against 
the defendant. He has to all appearances been 
the gainer in the transaction instead of a 
loser, even if a decree had been entered in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
59 Utah at 585. 
This formulation of the requirements for specific perfor-
mance is in accord with Utah's first major decision concerning 
the part performance doctrine, Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 
86 P. 767 (1906), wherein the Court held that the acts of 
part performance, if not at least the equivalent the value 
received by possession of the property, would not provide a 
basis for specific enforcement of an oral agreement. 
[I]t must appear that the improvements, relied 
upon as part performance are of a character 
permanently beneficial to the land and involving 
a sacrifice to him who made them because and 
in reliance of the [contract]. If he has 
gained more by the possession and use of the 
land than he has lost by his improvements, or 
if he has been fully compensated for the im-
provements, they will not be available to him 
as a ground for specific performance. 
31 Utah at 99. 
It was precisely this logic upon which the trial court 
relied in denying Mr. Coleman's claim for specific performance 
without even having to reach the question of the existence of a 
-9-
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contract. Because, as the Court found, the sum of all payme; 
and improvements made by Coleman during his period of posses: 
was substantially less than the reasonable rental value of 
the property during that period there was simply no equity 
favoring plaintiff and the operation of the statute of limit 
in voiding any alleged oral contract could not operate as a 
fraud upon him. 
This conclusion was clearly supported by the evidence 
showing that the defendant resided for over four years in 
a home with an undisputed rental value of over $300.00 a mon: 
and during that time he made no monthly payment for the las: 
31 mont~s of occupancy and was already deliquent in payment. 
the amount of $3,633.00 dollars prior to that time (R. 244, 
exhibit P-7), resulting in a total deficiency of approximate. 
$14,000 as of the time of trial. Even if the value of his 
alleged improvements is accepted as represented, this total 
is less than $1,000.00 and the equities still oppose grant~ 
any relief even if an oral agreement is assumed. 
In a comprehensive study published in the Utah Law Reiv1 
concerning the doctrine of part performance as it applies to 
oral land contract in Utah, it was noted that before specif~ 
performance of an oral agreement can be justified the party 
seeking such enforcement must be in compliance with the te~' 
of the contract respecting his part of the bargain. As the 
writer pointed out: 
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Although payment of consideration is 
not a requisite of the part performance doc-
trine, it is a requisite for specific per-
formance. This is based on the equitable maxim 
that a plaintiff who seeks equity must do 
equity. In a case where the performance 
promised by the plaintiff would not consitute 
equitable consideration, the court may even 
require modification of the original terms 
of the agreement, such as additional consid-
eration by the plaintiff, before granding 
specific performance. 
Note, The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral 
Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah Law Rev. 91, 94 n.24 (1964). 
It is axiomatic that any party seeking specific enforcement 
of a real estate contract bears the burden of showing that he 
has performed in conformity with the terms of the agreement 
he alleges before a court of equity will compel performance by 
the other party. Lincoln Land and Development Co. v. Thompson, 
26 Utah 2d 234, 489 P.2d 426 (1971). Far from establishing 
such fact, the evidence offered in this case shows that Mr. 
Coleman was in substantial default of the terms of the agree-
ment he alleged he had made with Mr. Dillman, both at the time 
his action was filed and for years preceding that date. Coleman 
seeks to avoid that default by asserting that he made a tender 
sufficient to excuse his performance, which assertion is 
clearly not supported by the facts established at trial. 
Appellant's allegation that he tendered the purchase price 
is predicated upon certain efforts he made to get a loan. 
The testimony was clear, however, that he never obtained any 
funds to pay off the alleged balance and he never tendered any 
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such amount of cash. This Court has previously noted that 
"tender requires that there be a bona fide, unconditional ob 
of payment of the amount of money due, coupled with an actua: 
production of the money or its equivalent." Zion's Propert~ 
Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). No such offw 
was made in this case. Mr. Coleman simply applied for a loat 
of $43, 000. 00 to pay off the home, which loan was never made, 
among other reasons, because there was no written agreement 
evidencing that Mr. Coleman had any interest in the property. 
(R. 168) 
~ppellant's assertion that Mr. Dillman was somehow ob-
ligated to take steps to assist Mr. Coleman to perform his po: 
of the alleged contract, and that his failure to do so 
relieves Coleman of his duty to perform, it unsupported by 
any authority and is contrary to law. There was absolutely 
no testimony presented by Mr. Coleman that performance of bE 
alleged contract was to result in his receiving a warranty ~ 
with covenants of title. Even under his version of the cont 
the agreement was merely that Mr. Dillman would "sell" him 
the property. Had such an agreement been cornrni tted to writi:. 
as a conveyance, no warranties would be thereby created by ~ 
plication and no duty to convey "clear title" would arise. 
The words 'give, grant, sell, and convey,' or 
equivalent expressions in a conveyance, do 
not of themselves imply a covenant of war-
ranty or of title, At common law, 
neither a covenant of seisin, nor a covenant 
-12-
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against encumbrances is implied in a deed of real 
property by the use of the words 'grant, bargain, 
sell, convey, and warrant.' 
20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions §13 
at 586 (1965). 
Therefore, the assertion by appellant that "in a purchase 
of real estate the seller has the obligation to deliver clear 
title," Brief of Appellant at pg. 6, is incorrect and the 
argument built on that premise is without force. 
In Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 
1975) , this Court set forth the requirements for specific 
performance of an oral real estate contract as follows: 
The oral contract and its terms must be 
clear, definite, mutually understood, and es-
tablished by clear, unequivocal and definite 
testimony, or other evidence of the same 
quality. In addition, there must be acts of 
part performance which in equity are considered 
sufficient to take the case out of the statute 
of frauds: (1) Any improvements made must be 
substantial, or valuable, or beneficial. (2) 
A valuable consideration is demanded by equity. 
(3) If there is possession, such possession must 
be actual, open definite not concurrent with 
the vendor, but it must be with the consent 
of the vendor. (4) Such acts as are relied on 
must be exclusively referable to the contract. 
534 P. 2d at 614. 
Under this standard, the relatively trivial improvements 
made by the appellant could not qualify as sufficient to 
constitute part performance. The testimony from Mr. Coleman 
was that in four years he put in some grass at a cost of 
$25.20 (exhibit P-9, R. 17-18), replaced four windows 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at a cost of $205.70 (exhibit P-8, R. 16-17), did repairs~ 
a furnace at a total cost of $133.63 (R. 17, exhibits P-10 ~ 
P-11) , and had some work done on the pipes on several occas; 
at a total cost of $194. 97 (R. 17, exhibit P-12). In short, 
so-called improvements amounted to less than normal househo:: 
maintenance at a total cost of $539. 50, or an average of les 
than $10.00 per month for the 55 months of plaintiff's oc~~ 
prior to trial. Courts recognize that where improvemtns maC; 
to property are minor in relation to the value of such pr~~ 
and are in the nature of upkeep which is to be expected of 
property residents they will not provide any basis for a dee: 
c= specific performance. See, e.g., Anderson v. l'lhipple, 7l 
Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 351 (1951). The trial court in the 
instant case was certainly justified in finding that the ck 
improvements were so insignificient that they could by no me: 
be held to constitute actions which altered Coleman's posit:: 
to such an extent that giving effect to the statute of fr~~ 
would impact inequitably upon him. 
It should be borne in mind that in reviewing a judgment 
of the district court in an action for specific performance: 
Court should reverse only if persuaded that the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings. Timpanogos Hi~ 
Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. ouzoun~ 
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970). Where, as here, the 
testimony and evidence presented by the plaintiff himself 5~ 
that he made only the most insignificiant improvements on 
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the property where he resided and that he was in substantial 
default of his obligations even under the terms of the agree-
ment he alleged to have been made, there is no basis in equity 
for a court to avoid the clear pronouncement of the statute of 
frauds and decree specific enforcement. 
Furthermore, because this is an equity action and this 
Court is at liberty to review the facts presented to determine 
if they are sufficient to support a decree of specific per-
formance, the respondent asserts that there was a complete 
failure by appellant to establish the terms of the alleged 
oral contract by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony or 
to show that such terms were mutually understood by the 
parties as required by Utah law. 
The only proof of the existence of the contract upon which 
plaintiff relied was his own assertion of the substance of a 
conversation he allegedly had with the defendant. Mr. Dillman 
denied that the conversation was as the plaintiff alleged and 
affirmatively represented that an oral lease agreement was 
reached. On such a record, there can be no question that 
the plaintiff failed to establish the threshold prerequisite 
for the relief sought. 
The plaintiff in declaring specific performance 
of an oral contract must establish the terms 
thereof with a greater degree of certainty than 
is required in an action at law, and he must 
show a clear mutual understanding and a posi-
tive agreement of both parties to the terms 
of the contract. (emphasis added) 
Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 102, 106, 339 P.2d 101 (1959); 
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Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502, 504 (1929). 
It is noteworthy that in the cases decided by this Cour: 
wherein specific performance of an oral contract concerning 
land has been granted, the existence of the oral agreement 
has been admitted by the defendant. When the defendant deni; 
the existence of such an oral agreement, as in the case at 
bar, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the agreement 
by other competent evidence before he can attempt to invoke 
the doctrine of part performance. As indicated in Note, 
The Doctrine of Part Performance as Aoplied to Oral Land 
Cc~t=ac~s in Utah, 9 Utah L.Rev. 91, 106 (1964), 
An admission by the defendant is, of course, 
the best parol proof. Short of this, a writing 
containing the terms of the contract, though 
insufficient to satisfy the Statute, would 
provide the next best evidence. If no 
writing of any kind is available, the terms 
of the contract would have to be established 
by the testimony of disinterested witnesses. 
Plaintiff has not proffered any of these three species of 
evidence and therefore has failed to provide proof of this 
vital first element, thereby forfeiting any claim for specif: 
performance. The need for clear proof of the oral contract 
is underscored by an additional requirement in actions for 
specific performance based upon part performance; namely, 
that the actions of the plaintiff which are claimed as part 
performance are exclusivelv referrable to the oral contract. 
In the landmark Utah case of Price v. Llovd, 31 Utah 86, 
86 P. 767 (1906), and again in the recent Holmgren Brothe0_' 
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supra, this Court has held that alleged acts of part performance 
cannot be relied upon to overcome the statute of frauds unless 
they are acts which clearly were taken as a direct result of 
the oral contract and would not have been taken for any other 
reason. Where, as in the case at bar, the acts claimed as 
part performance (taking possession, making some monthly 
payment and making minor repairs on the property) are just 
as consistent with a lease arrangement as with a contract for 
sale they cannot be relied upon either as evidence of the 
agreement or to support a finding of sufficient performance 
to remove the bar of the statute. 
The trial court did not address this contention because it 
felt that the quality of proof regarding the oral contract was 
a question which need not be reached given the inadequate 
performance of Mr. Coleman even under his own assertion of the 
terms of the agreement. However, the respondent respectfully 
submits that a review of the evidence presented shows this 
to be a second adequate basis to affirm the judgment entered 
by the court below. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of a jury trial in an action for 
specific performance was in accord with the established law 
of this jurisdiction in equity cases and does not constitute 
reversable error. While sitting as an equity court it was 
wholly appropriate for the trial court to find, on the evidence 
presented, that the appellant's acts of part performance had 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had raised no equities in his favor sufficient to support a 
decree of specific performance without even resolving the qu, 
of the existence of the alleged contract. However, the e~~ 
presented failed to establish the terms of the purported ora: 
contract in the manner this Court has indicated is necessaD 
and this failure provides an additional basis upon which t~ 
judgment of the court below can be supported. For these 
reasons the respondent respectfully requests that the judgm~ 
of the trial court be affirmed. 
DATED this day of August, 1980. 
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